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 Executive Summary 
 
In the context of the returns to education literature, this note compares the restrictions 
imposed by two selection models, the Roy model and Monotone Treatment Selection, as 
proposed by Manski and Pepper.   
While researchers agree that average individual earnings increase with years of 
schooling,the causality of this association as well as its magnitude is a subject of debate.  
Various econometric methods (twins, IV) have been used to calculate the returns to 
education, biased by the non-observability of various determinants that also determine 
earnings (such as ability) and mis-measurement error.  However, these methods impose 
various assumptions. 
Recently, several authors have attempted to characterise the magnitude of the returns 
to education without imposing such constraints.  Here, we concentrate on the non-parametric 
estimates proposed by Manski and Pepper (2000). Following Manski (1990) which relies 
solely on the distributions of the treatment and outcome variables to estimate bounds rather 
than point estimates, Manski and Pepper (2000) impose a set of restriction: monotonicity in 
the selection (MTS) and monotonicity in the response to the treatment (MTR), in order to 
tighten the the initial “worst-case” bounds.   
This non-parametric method leads to estimates of the returns to education that are 
lower than some obtained by instrumental variable.  However, the assumptions needed to 
derive these bounds may not be innocuous.  
This note compares the restrictions imposed by MTS and a weaker version of MTR 
on a selection model a la Roy (1951), where individuals choose the treatment maximising 
their expected outcome.  We limit ourselves to the bivariate case and we find that in general 
the MTS-MTR assumptions impose strong restrictions on the structure of the correlation 
between treatment decisions and rewards.  Far from being a “low-cost” estimation method in 
terms of restriction, the MTS-MTR bounds can be, on the contrary, based on stringent 
untestable constraints of the correlation structure of the model. This could explain the 
differences in the estimates provided by MTS-MTR and other estimates in the context of the 
returns to education literature. 
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Introduction 
 
For the past forty years, labour economists have been studying the relationship between 
schooling and earnings (see Card, 1999 for a recent review).  Universally, researchers 
observe that average individual earnings increase with years of schooling.  However, the 
causality of this association as well as its magnitude is a subject of debate.  On the one hand, 
Human Capital Theory predicts a positive and direct association between schooling and 
earnings, while on the other hand distinct theoretical arguments (for example signalling, 
Spence 1973) suggest that an unobserved factor, i.e. ability, is positively correlated with both 
education and earnings.  The latter point has important consequences in terms of empirical 
methodology.  Indeed, estimates obtained from least squares estimates are plagued by ability 
and endogeneity biases and by measurement error (Griliches, 1977).   
Despite the diversity of estimation methods used to provide unbiased estimates (twin 
studies, Instrumental Variable, propensity score matching), Ashenfelter et al. (1999) report in 
their meta-analysis that results are not sensitive to the technique used.  Moreover, these 
methods are contentious; see Neumark (1999) for criticisms on the twin literature, or Bound 
et al. (1995) and Angrist et al. (1996) on instrumental variables estimators and their 
interpretation.  Identification of the schooling effect crucially relies on the assumptions 
researchers impose on the data.   
Recently, several authors have attempted to characterise the magnitude of the returns 
to education without imposing such stringent constraints.  For example, Manski (1990) relies 
solely on the distributions of the treatment and outcome variables to estimate bounds rather 
than point estimates.  However, without further restrictions these “worst-case” bounds are not 
precise enough to provide much information on the “true” returns to education (Ginther, 
2000).   
In order to tighten the bounds, exclusion and/or monotonicity restrictions can be 
imposed.  Manski and Pepper (2000) show that by imposing the following two restrictions, 
i.e. monotonicity in the selection (MTS) and monotonicity in the response to the treatment 
(MTR), the initial “worst-case” bounds can be tightened.  MTR is equivalent to recognising 
that a higher level of treatment cannot have a negative effect on any individual’s outcome. 
MTS implies that individuals who choose a higher level of education level would receive  
above average rewards if they were otherwise reassigned to lower education levels. 
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This note compares the restrictions imposed by MTS and a weaker version of MTR 
on a selection model a la Roy (1951), where individuals choose the treatment maximising 
their expected outcome.  We limit ourselves to the bivariate case and we find that in general 
the MTS-MTR assumptions impose strong restrictions on the structure of the correlation 
between treatment decisions and rewards.  Far from being a “low-cost” estimation method in 
terms of restriction, the MTS-MTR bounds can be, on the contrary, based on stringent 
untestable constraints of the correlation structure of the model. 
 
 
Monotone Instrumental Variables 
 
Following Manski and Pepper (2000), we consider education as a treatment, which is 
possibly endogenously determined.  The returns to education can be defined as the 
differences between the population means for earnings, ( )Y t , associated with t years of 
schooling and for earnings, ( )Y s , associated with s years of schooling, 
 
 [ ]( , ) ( )) ( ( )D t s E Y t E Y s= - , (1) 
 
with s<t.  When earnings are measured in logarithm, this difference is equivalent to a rate of 
return and is therefore directly comparable to estimates obtained by conventional methods.  
As in any analysis of the effect of treatment, the difficulty is to compare the different 
groups, as individuals are only observed in one state and no information on the outcomes in 
the counterfactual states is available.  The analysis supposes then that the treatment chosen, 
measured in years of education, Z, is observed.  Some additional information is available in a 
monotone instrumental variable V.  V is a monotone instrumental variable in the sense that for 
any two different values in its range, say 1v  and 2v , with 21 nn < , 
 
]|)([]|)([ 21 nn =<= VtYEVtYE  (2) 
 
Note that Z can be a particularly convenient choice of such a monotone instrument variable, 
since it provides some hope that an estimate of the return can be obtained with a limited 
amount of extra information. 
 3
Manski and Pepper (2000) show that imposing some further structure on the latent 
distribution of rewards can lead to relatively tight intervals.  Two sets of assumptions taken 
together proved to have some power in that respect.  The first set of assumptions demands 
that the rewards depend in a monotonous fashion on the amount of education acquired 
(monotonicity in the response, MTR).  On the other hand, the second set of assumptions 
requires that more able individuals would be rewarded better than less able individuals at any 
level of education (monotonicity in the selection, MTS).  
MTS is based on the assumption that more able individuals earn more than less able 
individuals of the same educational level.  As education attained is a function of unobserved 
ability, MTS is expressed in terms of education attained; an individual A with a higher level 
of education than an individual B, is thought to be more able.  Hence, at all levels of 
education, A would have had higher returns than B.  Formally, the MTS assumption states 
that: 
 
2 1 2 1( ( ) / ) ( ( ) / )        t Tu u E y t z u E y t z u³ Þ = ³ = " Î  (3) 
 
for any possible value  of t . 
MTR assumes that for any given realisation of the couples, ( ) ( )( )2 1,Y t Y t , 
( ) ( )( )2 1,y t y tw w  say, we have 
)()( 1212 tytytt jj ³Þ³  (4)
  
i.e. in our schooling context, more schooling has a non negative effect on earnings. 
At first glance, these two assumptions do not appear to be too restrictive and appear 
rather plausible.  Furthermore imposing them allows us to obtain bounds on ( )[ ]E Y t , in 
terms of quantities easily measured with  data.  We have: 
 
E( / ) Pr( ) E( / ) Pr( )
                                    E( ( )
E( / ) Pr( ) E( / ) Pr( )
u t
u t
y z u z u y z t z t
y t
y z t z t y z u z u
<
>
= ´ = + = ´ =
£ £
= ´ = + = ´ =
å
å
 (5) 
 
where Y stands for the observed reward. 
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For every treatment level, the expected wage for all individua ls in the population can 
be bounded above and below.  Hence the difference in earnings between two levels of 
educational attainment is simply equal to the difference between the upper bound for the 
higher level of schooling and the lower bound for the lower level of schooling1.  In particular, 
it can then be shown that: 
 
u t
( , ) [ ( / ) ( / )] Pr( )
            [ ( / ) ( / )] Pr( )
             [E( / )-E( / )] Pr( )
<
>
£ = - = ´ =
+ = - = ´ £ £
+ = = ´ =
å
å
u s
D s t E y z t E y z u z u
E y z t E y z u s z t
y z u y z s z u
 (6) 
 
which bounds the return from above.  Such a bound is useful in practice since an estimate can 
be readily calculated from observed data.  Indeed estimates for all the quantities on the right-
hand side can be obtained as empirical means of observed quantities. 
 
 
Monotonicity and the Roy Model:  the Bivariate Normal Case 
 
The MTR and MTS assumptions are not innocuous.  In particular given the implied decision 
process that determines individual actions, these two assumptions limit the nature of the joint 
latent reward process in general.  This is easily seen in the context of a simple Roy model 
with normal distribution of skills.  Consider the simple case where individuals have the 
choice between two education levels 0 and 1.  Without loss of generality we can describe the 
latent wages as follows: 
 
0 0
1 1
(0) ,
(1) ,
Y
Y
b e
b e
= +
= +
 (7) 
 
where 0b  and 1b  are two constants, and where 0e  and 1e  are random variables which 
describe the heterogeneity in the population.  In what follows we assume a weaker version of 
MTR (WMTR), which requires only that: 
                                                 
1 Similarly, the lower bound can be defined as the difference between the lower bound for the higher level of 
schooling and the higher bound for the lower level of schooling. 
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E[Y(1)]E[(Y(0)] <  (8) 
 
The decision between the two education decisions, the binary indicator Z, is therefore 
such that: 
1001
100110
e  Y(0)Y(1) if   1
e  Y(1)Y(0) if   0
g
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We assume further that the heterogeneous returns to education for each education 
level are jointly normally distributed such that: 
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The relevant conditional moments are easily calculated.  For k=0 or 1, we have: 
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where 010 >g under WMTR, 
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and 
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MTS implies that: 
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Thus MTS imposes: 
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.  Hence MTS implies that the latent 
distribution of rewards without education must be less variable than the latent distribution of 
reward with some education, i.e. 10 ss < .  Furthermore, in order to satisfy MTS the 
correlation between rewards must be strictly positive.  Finally, in the limit as 10 ss ®  
imposing MTS and WMTR implies that all individuals acquire some education almost 
surely2. 
This conclusion changes somewhat if we introduce some unobserved heterogeneity in 
the choices, sayk h+ , where k  is some constant and h  is a random variable.  This can be 
understood as an individual specific fixed cost associated with the higher education level.  
Such an interpretation would lead to the following decision rule: 
 
0   if  (0) (1) ,
1   if  (0) (1) ,
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where ),0(~ hNh s . 
The joint distribution of the unobservable becomes now: 
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where: ),(and  ),( 1100 hecorrhecorr == dd and 
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And MTS implies that: 
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Thus the correlation between the latent rewards is now bounded above and below by 
quantities that can be of different signs: 
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In particular the correlation of importance here is ),( 00 hecorr=d , the correlation 
between the cost and the wage without education.  Indeed for values of 
0
1
s
s
 close to one, a 
negative value for 1d  does not modify the usual upper bound on a correlation, while a 
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positive value for 1d  does modify the upper bound and the existence of the correlation 
depends then on the value of 0d .  For example 
1
0
1
s
s
= , 
1 0
0.5h h
s s
s s
= = , and 0 0.5d = -  implies 
0.75r > .  For 1 0.5d >  r  is not defined, for 5.01 =d  r  is exactly 0.75, for smaller positive 
values of 1d  r  is bounded below by 0.75 and above by a quantity less than 1, and for any 
negative 1d  we have 0.75 1r£ £ .  
Moreover, the restrictions given by Vijverberg (1993), which ensure that the variance 
covariance matrix of the unobservables is semi-definite positive, need to be verified, i.e. 
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For example when 5.01 -=d , semi-positive definitiveness requires that r  belongs to 
the interval [ ]0.5,1-  which contains [ ]0.75,1  where MTS is true.  While if 5.01 =d  r  must 
belong to the interval [ ]1,0.5-  and this does not include 75.0=r .  
Furthermore if we believe that the latent rewards are uncorrelated, i.e. 0=r , for the 
extended Roy model to satisfy MTS, it is necessary for the correlations between the fixed 
costs and the latent rewards to be such that: 
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and furthermore defineteness when 0=r  demands 
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2
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However, this is satisfied when hs , the variance of the fixed costs, is large relative to 
the variance of the latent reward ( )0Y , i.e. when 0ss >h , and for fixed costs moderately 
correlated with ( )0Y . 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This straightforward exercise clearly shows that the monotonicity assumptions that Manski 
imposes, are not compatible in general with the decision process assumed by the original Roy 
model and its extensions.  The Roy model assumes that individuals decide on the level of 
education which leads to the highest level of earnings.  In the normal case, for a range of 
parameter values, this is at odds with the MTS hypothesis.  The MTS hypothesis requires that 
better able individuals are on average better rewarded whatever their educational attainment, 
i.e. not only do they choose more education but even if education was not available to them 
they would obtain a higher reward on average than the average individual choosing the lower 
education level.  The Roy model does not impose such a requirement on the latent 
distribution of rewards, it only requires that individuals decide on the basis of the highest 
reward.  Potentially, a better-educated individual, if denied the chance of an education may 
end up with a lower than average wage among the less educated group. 
Hence the claims in Manski and Pepper (2000, Footnote 8) that the “MTS restriction 
is consistent with economic models of schooling choice” and that the “MTR restriction is 
consistent with economic models of the production of human capital through schooling” to be 
made more precise at least in the prototypical case of the bivariate Roy Model with normal 
unobservables.  The measurements of the bounds which are obtained when both hypotheses 
are imposed, may not be as restriction free as one may believe at first glance.
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